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Introduction 
In What to Listen for in Music, Aaron Copland considers whether music 
has meaning. “My answer to that”, he maintains, “would be, ‘Yes’. ‘Can 
you state in so many words what the meaning is?’ My answer to that would 
be, ‘No’.”1 Doris Humphrey similarly surmises: “The dancer believes that 
his art has something to say which cannot be expressed in words or in any 
other way than by dancing”.2 What Copland and Humphrey claim about 
music and dance is widely believed about nonverbal art including painting, 
sculpture, architecture, photography, video, and multi-media installation: 
their experience cannot in principle be articulated through language. Yet as 
widespread as the view may be, there have been few attempts to 
substantiate it and, to my knowledge, none have succeeded. It seems that 
two distinct challenges face the proponent of aesthetic ineffability. The first 
is to offer an account of the property of ineffability, and the second is to 
establish that such a property is instantiated by specific artworks and the 
aesthetic experiences elicited by them. The former, I take it, is the more 
fundamental task. For without knowing what ineffability is, it is not 
apparent that one could convincingly establish whether it is instantiated. Of 
course, one might wonder whether this task is not paradoxical. How, it 
might be asked, can one explain in words what “allegedly” cannot be put 
into words? Despite appearances, this is not a genuine paradox. Just as one 
could explain what infinity is without reverting to an infinitely long 
explanans, to explain ineffability does not imply an ineffable explanans. 
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1 Aaron Copland, What to Listen for in Music (Toronto: Mentor Books, 1963), p. 19. 
2 In Jean Brown, Naomi Mindlin, Charles Woodford (eds), The Vision of Modern Dance 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Book Company, 1998), pp. 58-59. 
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In what follows, I offer an account of ineffability by assuming its 
instantiation in a number of works from the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries. I begin by outlining three constraints that any account should 
meet. Next, I review various attempts to account for ineffability. After 
identifying problems confronting their accounts, I outline an alternative that 
addresses these problems and substantiates the view to which so many, 
including myself, are beholden. 
 
Three Constraints on an Account 
When claiming that an experience cannot in principle be articulated 
through language, one generally is not uttering a prohibition, as when a 
tribe forbids the utterance of the names of their dead or a critic denounces 
an artwork. In his acerbic review of Edouard Manet’s Olympia and Ecce 
Homo, it is doubtful that Paul de Saint-Victor meant to say anything about 
ineffability when he wrote, “Art sunk so low doesn’t deserve reproach. ‘Do 
not speak of them: observe and pass on’. Virgil says to Dante while 
crossing one of the abysses of hell.” 3  Rather, like many of his 
contemporaries who strolled through Room M of the Salon, Saint-Victor 
considered Manet’s work unspeakable. Unlike ineffability, unspeakability 
is a normative property determined by artistic tastes, moral commitments, 
religious beliefs, societal customs, and so on, which may vary in degree 
and change from person to person and circumstance to circumstance. By 
contrast, to claim that an aesthetic experience cannot in principle be 
articulated through language is to attribute to it a descriptive property, one 
invariable through changes in human psychology, discipline, culture, and 
so on. 
It would, therefore, be mistaken to suppose that the experience of 
an artwork is ineffable because an individual lacks the requisite linguistic, 
psychological or conceptual resources, in the way a young child is unable 
to describe her day at the zoo or a self-deceived pedant fails to recall a 
night of philandering. Explanations based on an individual’s limitations, 
whether lexical, rational, mnemonic, conceptual, and so on, threaten to 
relativize ineffability out of hand, allowing experiences of one and the 
same work to vary in their degree of ineffability from person to person. 
                                                
3 Paul Saint-Victor, ‘Review of Manet in the Salon’ (from La Presse) reprinted in Charles 
Harrison, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger (eds), Art in Theory 1815-1900 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), pp. 514-515. 
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Moreover, it also allows the possibility that such a work is effable and 
ineffable to a single individual at different times and to different 
individuals at the same time. 
It would also be misguided to suppose that ineffability is 
determined by current limitations of a discipline, a culture or human 
understanding generally. To presume that the experience of Jean Sibelius’ 
Second Symphony could completely and conclusively be articulated 
sometime in the future, once our aesthetic vocabulary and concepts have 
progressed sufficiently, in the way an accurate description of light may one 
day be formulated within a mature physical theory, or in the way Hegel 
believed that art would eventually be superseded by philosophy and its 
meaning clearly articulated by it, also gives the wrong emphasis to ‘cannot 
in principle’. When understood substantively, the ineffability of an artwork 
or aesthetic experience is not something that individuals, disciplines, 
cultures, and so on, can overcome. In a word, ineffability is indefeasible. 
To account for the invariability of ineffability (that is, its non-
relative and indefeasible character), many writers have waxed 
metaphysical. Following Arthur Schopenhauer, some insist that music 
expresses the indivisible, inner essence of the world: “music... never 
expresses the phenomenon, but only the inner nature, the in-itself, of every 
phenomenon, the will itself.”4 Or, by appealing to Martin Heidegger’s 
tenebrous conception of truth or Susanne Langer’s evocative claim that the 
logic of feeling is incommensurate with the logic of language, it is 
supposed that the latter cannot in principle articulate truth or feeling.5 In 
other words, it is tempting to secure ineffability’s non-relative and 
indefeasible character by positing an unchanging metaphysical presence 
that, as the presumed subject-matter of (nonverbal) art, remains forever out 
of linguistic reach. 
The metaphysical view is often motivated by a version of the 
Isomorphic Representation Thesis. The thesis claims that only media with 
the same logical structure can express or represent the meaning of an 
artwork. An artwork, sentence or mental state must allegedly have a logical 
                                                
4 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1966), p. 261 (§52). 
5 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, reprinted in David Krell (ed.), Basic 
Writings: Martin Heidegger (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1977), pp. 143-206; Susanne Langer, 
Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art (New York: Scribner, 1953), pp. 104-119. 
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structure that is isomorphic with the ontological structure of its reference, 
e.g. a subject-predicate (propositional) structure is only able to represent 
states of affairs (a thing[s] bearing a property). Since language is taken to 
have a logical structure that is propositional and art is not, language cannot 
express or represent what art does. Consequently, art is considered to be 
about something other than what language is. In this way, the Isomorphic 
Representation Thesis motivates some to posit the existence of entities that 
are ontologically distinct from states of affairs. 
While tempting, this general approach to ineffability is 
unsatisfactory for several reasons. To begin, it seems entirely stipulative to 
account for ineffability by positing a weighty metaphysics and presuming 
that it is the subject-matter of all art. Why presume that all works of music, 
dance, painting, sculpture, architecture, and so on, express or represent the 
inner essence of the world or the truth of being, setting itself to work or 
feelings with a unique and incommensurate form? Why not suppose that 
nonverbal artworks are about the very same things that you and I might talk 
about, e.g. love, war, fear, hope or the state of the union. (It seems rather 
desperate to inflate one’s metaphysics just for the sake of explaining 
ineffability.) Moreover, what evidence is there for claiming that language 
can only represent entities with structures like its own—why should we 
accept the Isomorphic Representation Thesis? Or why, for that matter, 
suppose that linguistic structure is essentially propositional? 
Perhaps the most basic problem with these approaches concerns 
their mis-emphasis. It is often assumed that ineffability is a property of the 
reference of an aesthetic experience, of what it is about. In other words, the 
assumption is that there are certain entities that resist being represented 
through language, e.g. human feelings. This strikes me as utterly wrong-
headed. For the problem is not that we cannot use sentences or utterances to 
refer to these entities—even if we currently do not have names for certain 
entities, we could surely create them! Rather, what needs explaining is why 
the intentional content of an artwork or aesthetic experience cannot be 
borne by an indicative sentence or assertoric utterance (or set thereof). 
The concept of intentionality was re-introduced to modern 
philosophy by Franz Brentano, who claimed that intentionality, as a 
property, is unique and essential to mental states and experiences. It is in 
virtue of possessing this property, he maintained, that the mental cannot be 
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reduced to, or identified with, the physical.6 Since then, intentionality has 
been attributed to meaningful utterances and artworks as a way of 
distinguishing them, respectively, from nonsense and mere objects or 
events.7 Like mental states and linguistic utterances, artworks and the 
experiences they elicit are taken to be about objects, events, properties, 
states of affairs, and so on, whether real or fictional, concrete or abstract. 
Ineffability, then, is a purported property of the intentional content of an 
artwork and aesthetic experience. To claim that an artwork or aesthetic 
experience is linguistically articulatable (effable) is to claim that its 
intentional content can be borne by an indicative sentence or an assertion. 
Conversely, to claim that an artwork or aesthetic experience is ineffable is 
to claim that its content cannot in principle be borne by an indicative 
sentence or assertion. 
Because aesthetic experiences have other properties besides 
intentionality—reference and phenomenology for instance—we should take 
care to distinguish them from it. As Gottlob Frege pointed out, different 
contents (senses) like those of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ can be co-
referential.8 Or consider another example. Both Auguste Rodin’s Burghers 
of Calais and Jean Froissart’s tale of the valiant self-sacrifice of the six 
citizens of Calais refer to the same event but nevertheless do not share the 
same content. Consequently, Froissart’s tale does not articulate the content 
of the sculpture or the aesthetic experience it elicits. Moreover, it is 
conceivable that the contents of different aesthetic experiences are distinct 
even though their phenomenological character is the same. The feelings and 
sensations elicited by Burghers of Calais, for example, may be identical to 
those elicited by an appropriation of the sculpture. But, as Hilary Putnam 
and Arthur Danto have vividly illustrated—the former through his twin 
earth scenario, the latter through his imagined gallery of indiscernibles—
                                                
6 Franz Brentano, Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint, trans. Antos Rancurello, D. B. 
Terrell and Linda McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 88. 
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd., 1983), p. 27 and Arthur Danto, ‘Art and Meaning’, The Madonna of the 
Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), pp. xvii-xxx. 
8 Gottlob Frege, ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung’, The Frege Reader, ed. Michael Beaney (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 151-171. 
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experiences that are phenomenologically indistinguishable may not have 
the same content.9 
It is noteworthy that invariability (non-relativity and 
indefeasibility) is a property of ineffability not intentionality. As 
postmodernists are fond of claiming, aesthetic content changes from person 
to person, circumstance to circumstance, and even moment to moment. 
While I doubt that this is true to the extent that some allege, the claim that 
aesthetic content is radically unstable is compatible with the invariability of 
ineffability. In other words, the variability of intentionality does not imply 
the variability of ineffability. 
Yet, even if the instability of aesthetic content is granted, in the 
case of great art these contents remain significant. Unlike mundane 
experiences, those elicited by great art “express great truths of life”, as 
Martha Graham put it.10 We tend to value them over mundane perceptual 
experiences of, say, red strawberries, creaking doors, jagged stones or 
fluttering laundry. In fact, as Roger Scruton observes, if all artworks, 
whether profound or “trite” and “meaningless” expressed contents that are 
ineffable, the appropriate response would be “So what?” as “this gives us 
no reason for thinking that music [art in general] tells us anything that we 
wanted to know”.11 While an account of ineffability might not be expected 
to tell us why this is the case, we should expect it to accommodate the 
point. And of course in doing so, we should take care to avoid some of the 
aforementioned pitfalls. For example, it would be unduly stipulative to 
claim that an experience elicited by a nonverbal artwork is significant 
because it is about an otherworldly metaphysical presence like the inner 
essence of the world. And likewise, linking significance exclusively to the 
phenomenology of an aesthetic experience would be misguided. For strictly 
speaking, significance, like ineffability itself, is a property of an artwork or 
experience’s intentionality, not its reference or phenomenology. 
                                                
9 Hilary Putnam, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 215-271; Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 1-32. 
10 Martha Graham, ‘Martha Graham is Interviewed by Pierre Tugat’, Dancing Times (October 
1950), p. 22. A very similar claim is made by Rafael De Clerq, ‘Aesthetic Ineffability’, Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, vol. 7, nos 8-9 (2000). 
11 Roger Scruton, ‘Effing the Ineffable’, Big Questions Online, November 4, 2010, at 
https://www.roger-scruton.com/articles/301-effing-the-ineffable. Accessed 17/9/2017. 
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Where does this leave us? We now have three constraints on a 
account of aesthetic ineffability: 
(1) invariability: ineffability is a non-relative and indefeasible property 
of an artwork or aesthetic experience, 
(2) intentionality: ineffability is a property of an artwork or experience’s 
content and 
(3) significance: an experience elicited by a (great) artwork tends to be 
valued over mundane experiences. 
I now turn to some attempts at explaining ineffability. 
 
Psychological and Metaphysical Accounts 
In Language, Music and Mind, Diana Raffman offers an account of musical 
ineffability based on the fine-grained character of perceptual experience, 
which she contrasts with the relative course-grained structure of our mental 
schema. The idea is that while we, as human beings, are able to hear subtle 
variations in pitch and intervals, we are often unable to name them. 
According to Raffman, nuances of pitch and interval (N-pitches and N-
intervals) cannot be named because we cannot recognize them, and we 
cannot recognize them because we cannot remember them. The problem 
allegedly is that we lack the requisite mental schema that would enable us 
to remember and therefore recognize and name these musical nuances. 
However, “it is overwhelmingly unlikely that we have, or could have, 
interval schema as fine-grained as the N-pitches and N-intervals we can 
hear”.12 Hence, just as we cannot recognize and name each shade of color 
we see, we cannot recognize and name each variation in the musical 
parameters we hear. 
Although Raffman focuses her account on the ineffability of 
musical experience, it is easily extended to nonverbal art generally. For 
example, like the experiences elicited by music, those elicited by painting, 
photography, dance, video, sculpture and architecture have a fineness of 
grain that, by outstripping our memory, we are unable to recognize or 
name. The shapes and shades of color in a painting or photograph, the 
patterns and celerity of movement in a dancework or video, and the shapes 
and spacial volume of sculptures and buildings are more fine-grained than 
the course-grained schema at our disposal. Hence, like N-pitches and N-
intervals which we hear in music, we cannot name the N-shapes and N-
shades we see in painting and photography, the N-patterns and N-celerity 
                                                
12 Diana Raffman, Language, Music and Mind (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 83. 
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we see in dance or video, or the N-shapes and N-spacial volumes we see in 
sculpture and architecture. 
While intuitive, the account has two basic flaws. The first concerns 
its inability to account for invariability, which is apparent in several ways. 
As Raffman herself observes, “it is entirely possible that some of us, with a 
great deal of practice, could acquire schema more fine-grained than our 
present chromatic ones”.13 Consequently, for those able to acquire more 
fine-grained schema, their aesthetic contents will be less ineffable, 
suggesting that ineffability is a relative rather than absolute property. 
Second, the course-grained structure of our schema might be supplemented 
and refined through scientific instrumentation and the acquisition of 
scientific vocabulary. For example, the specific pitches and intervals we 
hear can be measured and named exactly according to their frequency, 
pitch, and so on, providing us with a means for remembering and naming 
them. And third, our schema might also be refined through genetic 
engineering, neurotechnology or even evolution. In fact, it is conceivable 
that nonverbal artworks are never ineffable to certain natural or artificial 
entities who, by some means, have come to possess the requisite fine-
grained schema. 
The second problem concerns significance. In identifying ineffable 
content as the fine-grained character of experience, Raffman does not 
explain how such aesthetic contents could be valued over the contents of 
mundane experiences. On a daily basis I am assaulted with sights and 
sounds that I can neither recognize, remember nor name, allegedly because 
their colors, pitches, patterns of movement, and so on, are too nuanced for 
my course-grained schema. The experience of the redness of a strawberry, 
the creaking of a door, the jaggedness of a stone, or the fluttering of 
laundry on a clothesline has a fineness of grain that I am unable to 
articulate. Yet none of these sights and sounds is especially important to 
me. My experiences of their colors, pitches and/or patterns of movement, as 
nuanced as they are, do not represent ‘great truths of life’. It is, therefore, 
unclear how the significance we attach to an experience elicited by a work 
of music, painting, dance, sculpture, and so on, can be accommodated by 
appealing to its fineness of grain. 
Roger Scruton offers an account of ineffability that initially seems 
to explain invariability and to accommodate significance. “The ineffability 
                                                
13 Raffman, Language, Music and Mind, p. 84.  
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of artistic meaning is”, as he puts it, “simply a special case of the 
ineffability of first-person awareness—the impossibility of translating 
‘what it is like’ into a description”. 14  The account rests on three 
assumptions: first, that the mental has two distinct aspects, the subjective 
and objective; second, that there is a unique form of knowledge proper to 
each, viz. a first- and third-person perspective; and third, that language is a 
form of knowledge and is necessarily third-person. Like human beings, 
nonverbal artworks express subjective mental aspects like feelings and 
states of consciousness (‘what it is like’). In the case of a human being, this 
is done through objective mental aspects like behavior and facial 
expressions, while in the case of an artwork It is done through expressive 
gestures or features characteristic of the art form, e.g. pitches and intervals 
in the case of music. Although objective aspects express subjective aspects, 
the feelings and states of consciousness themselves can be understood only 
through empathy, from the first-person perspective. Since linguistic 
understanding is considered a form of third-person knowledge, the 
subjective aspects of aesthetic experiences are considered ineffable. 
Because a (good) artwork “introduces new states of mind, by 
providing the expressive gestures that convey them”, we tend to value it 
over the mundane sights and sounds of red strawberries, creaking doors, 
jagged stones, and fluttering laundry.15 In other words, Scruton seems to 
accommodate significance. Moreover, since the gap between the first- and 
third-person perspective is taken to be unbridgeable, ineffability is an 
invariable feature of aesthetic content. It is neither relative from person to 
person or circumstance to circumstance nor defeasible by advances in 
human understanding. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Scruton does not 
attempt to secure invariability by appealing to an inflated metaphysics. As 
he is careful to point out, “The difference between being in pain and 
merely observing pain in another does not lie in the difference between an 
awareness of ‘subjective’ facts and an awareness of their outer expression. 
It lies in the difference between a first- and a third-person perspective on 
one and the same state of affairs.”16 
For all of this, however, the account is not without flaws. To begin 
with, while the first- and third-person perspectives may present the same 
                                                
14 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 364. 
15 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, pp. 361-362. 
16 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, p. 362. 
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state of affairs, it is worth emphasizing that it is mental—in fact, the state of 
affairs of which Scruton speaks is necessarily phenomenological. For the 
claim is that an artwork is ineffable in virtue of the feelings and states of 
consciousness it expresses. In effect, this suggests a psychologistic 
interpretation of the subject-matter of ineffable art, one that is certainly too 
restrictive. Moreover, the account suggests that we value the ineffable 
contents of aesthetic experiences over those of mundane experiences 
because of an obsession we have with new phenomenological states. In 
other words, the so-called “great truths of life” that cannot be articulated 
are merely novel feelings and states of consciousness. Thus Scruton, it 
would seem, offers not only a psychologistic interpretation of art’s subject-
matter but a hedonistic conception of its significance. 
The most fundamental problem, however, concerns his explicit 
assumptions concerning language and the first- and third-person 
perspectives. Even if we grant that there are subjective and objective 
aspects of the mental and we accept that language is a form of knowledge 
(rather than a way of articulating knowledge), without support we should 
not accept the assumption that each aspect has a unique form of knowledge 
or the assumption that language can only articulate third-person 
perspectives. In fact, it is apparent that both assumptions are informed by a 
version of the Isomorphic Representation Thesis, viz. that linguistic 
knowledge is necessarily propositional and knowledge from the first-person 
is not: “its content cannot be described since it contains no proposition 
known”.17 But why, let me ask again, assume that language is necessarily 
propositional? And even if it were necessarily propositional, why can it 
represent or express only the objective aspects of the mental? And even if 
language, for whatever reason, is currently unable to represent or express 
‘what it is like’, what prevents it from doing so in the future? As Thomas 
Nagel himself concedes, such a vocabulary might be developed: 
At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective 
character of experience without relying on the imagination—without 
taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be 
regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new 
method—an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the 
imagination.18 
                                                
17 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, p. 362. 
18 Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974), p. 427. 
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Laird Addis suggests a partial explanation for invariability in his own 
account of the ineffable. Like Scruton, Addis maintains that works of music 
(and let us assume of any nonverbal artwork) express mental states like 
moods, emotions and other conscious experiences. However, according to 
him, the experiences of these states involve an infinite number of 
phenomenological properties that form a “dense continuum but for which, 
because of the natures of the properties involved, there can be no 
‘algorithm of naming’”. 19  Of course, it is not just because there are 
presumably an infinite number of phenomenological properties that an 
algorithm of naming cannot be developed. After all, in the case of the 
infinite series of whole numbers, we have such an algorithm. Rather, what 
prevents this alleged infinite number of phenomenological properties from 
being named is the fact that they are available only to the first-person 
perspective of a finite being. While the infinite subtlety of 
phenomenological properties is presumably felt by finite beings like us, our 
mental schema will always be too coarse-grained to allow them all to be 
named (since they cannot all be recognized or remembered). For 
irrespective of the degree to which our schema are supplemented (e.g. 
through scientific instrumentation) or refined (e.g. through genetic 
engineering), we will, as finite beings, always fall linguistically short. 
It should be emphasized that even if Addis had a sound explanation 
for invariability, his view does no better than Scruton’s on the issue of 
subject-matter or significance. For his account also suggests that the 
subject-matter of ineffable artworks is necessarily phenomenological, 
implying a rather psychologistic view. And like Scruton, his conception of 
the significance of ineffable aesthetic contents is at best hedonistic. 
Moreover, while Addis seems partially to explain invariability, he leaves 
open the possibility that the same aesthetic experience has varying degrees 
of ineffability, suggesting that it is a relative, rather than absolute, property. 
Thus, individuals with supplemented or more refined schema will be able 
to recognize and remember and, therefore, name more phenomenological 
properties. 
Yet, despite these shortcomings, one might suppose that Addis has 
given a substantive explanation for why ineffable aesthetic contents are 
indefeasible. Since any aesthetic (or, for that matter, mundane) experience 
                                                
19 Laird Addis, Of Mind and Music (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 81. 
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involves infinitely fine-grained phenomenological properties, an infinitely fine-
grained schema would be required to name them. However, as finite material 
beings, humans (or any other material beings) cannot in principle acquire such 
schema, suggesting that they could never articulate the infinitely fine-grained 
phenomenology they presumably feel. But should we accept the claim that 
human beings actually experience an infinite number of phenomenological 
properties? How could one remain a materialist and accept this. Surely, only a 
finite number of phenomenological properties could supervene on a human 
being, which as materialists we must assume is a finite material base that can 
be arranged only in a finite number of ways. 
The objection can be formulated as dilemma. Either Addis can deny 
that the mental supervenes on the physical (i.e. reject that a mental difference is 
possible only with a physical difference), in which case he would be 
advocating a form of ontological dualism and thereby ushering in an inflated 
metaphysics. Or he can accept the supervenience of the mental on the physical 
and admit that human beings can experience only a finite number of 
phenomenological properties, in which case his account would not explain why 
an algorithm of naming could not in principle be developed and, thus, why 
ineffability is indefeasible. By embracing the latter horn of this dilemma, his 
position would closely resemble Raffman’s and thereby be subject to the same 
objection about invariability. Although Addis seems to favor the former, 
neither option is very welcome. 
 
The Semantic Account 
The dilemma facing Addis is, in fact, the challenge facing contemporary and 
historical accounts generally. Can the invariability of ineffability be explained 
without inflating one’s metaphysics? In an effort to meet this challenge, 
philosophers like Raffman and Scruton offer psychological explanations. 
However, such accounts are problematic because they do not satisfactorily 
explain the invariability of ineffability. On the other hand, while Addis 
manages partially to explain invariability, he does so only by assuming the 
existence of immaterial phenomenological properties. It should be obvious that 
if an account is to be successful, it must steer clear of both the psychological 
and the metaphysical approaches that these and other philosophers advocate. 
The alternative I propose is neither psychological nor metaphysical but 
semantic. At its heart are two claims. The first is that aesthetic force is 
essentially functionless and the second is that this force is an indissoluble 
aspect of the contents of artworks and aesthetic experiences that are ineffable. 
With these two claims, I believe a more promising explanation of ineffability 
can be formulated. 
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Like the sentences, utterances and intentional states, artworks and the 
experiences they elicit have intentionality. If they did not, then describing them 
as ineffable would be a category mistake since, as I mentioned earlier, 
ineffability is a property of the intentional content of an object, event, and so 
on. Yet once we grant that artworks and aesthetic experiences have 
intentionality, it follows that they also have force. Roughly speaking, aesthetic 
force is the way an artwork or aesthetic experiences’s content is presented, akin 
to the way a speech act presents its content. For example, the content, Aaron 
will become a musician, can be presented through different illocutionary 
forces, e.g. assertion, question, promise or apology. Hence, just as I may assert 
that Aaron will become a musician and you may ask whether he will become a 
musician, his piano teacher may promise that he will become a musician, and 
Aaron himself may apologize that he will become a musician. In this way, the 
same content is presented in various ways through different illocutionary 
forces.20 
It may initially seem that artworks have the same force types as speech 
acts. For example, Manet’s Olympia, which depicts a prostitute reclining on a 
bed, to whom a black female servant brings flowers, caused quite a brouhaha 
when first shown in the Musée d’Orsay in 1865. While few appreciated the 
painting’s significance at the time, it has since been identified as having 
numerous aims, e.g. asserting the hypocrisy of an art-going bourgeoisie, 
questioning the role of spectatorship in art, and promising or predicting the 
empowerment of women by likening a Parisian prostitute to Titian’s Venus of 
Urbino. It may, of course, have been (and continue to be) doing all of this and 
more. Just as utterances can have more than one illocutionary force and 
content, e.g. ‘Do you have a dollar?’ may serve as a question and a request to 
be given a dollar, it may be suggested that an artwork like Olympia has various 
force types and contents, similar to those we use as speakers. 
I do not deny that the ascription of illocutionary force types to 
artworks is tempting. But it is noteworthy that such ascriptions are rarely if 
ever genuine. The obvious problem is that many artworks do not assert, 
question or promise anything. When listening to Sibelius’ Second Symphony or 
watching Merce Cunningham’s Beach Birds, most of us do not recognize 
anything resembling a speech act. Of course, this has not stopped critics from 
ascribing them to artworks. In his review of Symphony San Jose’s performance 
of Sibelius’ Second, Scott MacClelland writes, “The opening movement 
asserts, then pulls back, accelerates then goes circumspect, alternates building 
                                                
20 York Gunther, ‘What Art Could Be’, Literature and Aesthetics, vol. 26 (2016), p. 135f. 
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and relaxing as it retreats to chamber music before going fully symphonic”.21 
And in response to Beach Birds, Laura Jacobs explains, “As only the cry of a 
gull in the air can do, the dance questions the meaning of life, the transience, 
the wind”.22 But it is apparent that these ascriptions are merely metaphorical. 
To be genuine, the speech act would have to meet certain conditions. For 
example, an utterance like ‘Doris is a dancer’ can be an assertion only if the 
speaker believes in the truth of the assertoric content and an utterance like ‘Do 
you have a dollar?’ can be a question only if the speaker intends the hearer to 
do something, viz. answer. 
The problem is that artworks do not meet such conditions, which is 
apparent in two ways. First, an artwork’s subject-matter need not be something 
that the artist or performer needs to have the corresponding beliefs, intentions 
and so on about. For example, when painting Ophelia, Millais need not have 
believed that there was a maiden spurned by Hamlet who committed suicide. 
The same is, of course, true of verbal works such as novels, poems and plays. 
Like Millais, neither Shakespeare nor any actors who perform Hamlet have to 
believe (or have believed) that a lovely maiden named ‘Ophelia’ was actually 
driven to suicide by an indecisive Danish prince.23  As Danto maintains, 
artworks are “dreamlike” in that “It is not necessary that they be true”.24And 
second, to insist that an artwork’s force should be fixed by the conscious 
mental states an artist has at the time of its creation is to assume some version 
of the Intentional Fallacy: “the design or intention of the author is neither 
available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of 
literary art”.25 The implausibility of the view is perhaps most evident in cases 
where aleatory techniques are employed in the creation and/or performance of 
artworks, e.g. in the music of John Cage, the choreography of Merce 
Cunningham, and the painting of Jackson Pollock. But it is also generally true. 
For unlike genuine speech acts, artworks have a life of their own, independent 
of the conscious mental states of their creators and performers. 
                                                
21 Scott MacClelland, ‘Shining Sibelius’, Metroactive: Silicon Valley’s Weekly Newspaper 
(March 6-12 issue, 2003) at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/03.06.03/symphony-
0310.html. Accessed 17/9/2017. My emphasis. 
22 Laura Jacobs, ‘Petipaw’, The New Criterion, vol. 20, no. 7 (March 2002) at 
https://www.newcriterion.com/issues/2002/3/petipaw. Accessed 17/9/2017. My emphasis. 
23 See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
pp. 70-105.  
24 Arthur Danto, What Art Is (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 48. See also York 
Gunther, ‘What Art Could Be’, pp. 133-135.  
25 Munroe Beardsley and W. K. Wimsatt, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, Sewanee Review, vol. 54, no. 
3 (1946), p. 466. 
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The same considerations can be raised against the common 
assumption that artworks express emotions. Like other speech acts, expressive 
utterances presuppose an experience of emotion at the time of the utterance. 
For example, ‘I apologize for coming late’ is a genuine apology only if the 
speaker feels regret for coming late. To say that an artwork expresses sadness, 
anger or joy presupposes that the artist or perhaps the performer experiences 
these emotions. However, this need not be the case. A painter, composer, 
choreographer, sculptor, and so on, or for that matter a performer, need not 
experience sadness at the time they create or perform an artwork that is 
expressive of sadness. 
If artworks generally do not have the same force types as speech acts, 
what kind of force do they have? As I hope is clear, to suggest that they do not 
have force is not plausible. For if artworks and the experiences they elicit are 
ineffable, then they must have content, and the fact that they have content 
presupposes that they embody or bear this content in some way, which is what 
their force involves. What I propose is that artworks and aesthetic experiences 
have a distinctive kind of force, which is unique to them. Like illocutionary 
forces, aesthetic force has a function (point). Yet, where an assertion commits 
the speaker to the truth of a content and a question requires that the speaker 
intends for the hearer to answer, an artwork and the experience it elicits have a 
function without a function. In other words, the way artworks and aesthetic 
experiences present their contents is as functionless or purposeless. In claiming 
this, I am not suggesting that artworks and aesthetic experiences lack a 
function—this would be equivalent to saying that they lack force. Rather, what 
I am suggesting is that there is a distinctive way in which aesthetic content is 
presented, viz. as functionless. 
Aesthetic force, I suggest, is an essential property of all artworks, 
whether verbal or nonverbal. Their function without function helps to 
distinguish them from other content-bearing media, whether linguistic, mental 
or artificial. This is not to say that an artwork’s force is transparent. One might 
not recognize the fact that the object before one has a function without 
function. But this just illustrates that aesthetic force is not a perceptual 
property—artworks need not wear their force on their sleeves. This, of course, 
is true of utterances as well, e.g. to recognize that ‘Do you have a dollar?’ is a 
request, we need to appeal to something external to it, viz. an intention. But the 
difference is that in the case of an artwork this non-perceptual, external 
component need not be fixed by the artist or performer’s conscious mental 
states. Just what, then, might fix an object’s aesthetic force? This will depend 
on the theory of art one endorses. For example, aesthetic force might be fixed 
external to the artwork by appealing to the artist’s unconscious mental states, 
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the social conditions of the work’s origin, the audience’s experience of the 
work, the art community’s reception of it, and so on. In the present context, it 
is not necessary to decide on any of these theoretical options. 
Now, let us return to ineffability. The fact that artworks and aesthetic 
experiences have a distinctive kind of force does not yet explain their 
ineffability. Recall that an experience can be articulated (is effable) if its 
content can be borne by an indicative sentence or assertion. In the case of an 
artwork or aesthetic experience, its content would be articulated if it could be 
separated from its aesthetic force and reattached (so to speak) to an indicative 
sentence or assertion. Hence, the functionless presentation of content by 
artworks and aesthetic experiences alone does not explain the ineffability of 
their content. The additional assumption we need is that artworks and aesthetic 
experiences violate the force/content distinction.26 Let me explain. 
The force/content distinction states that content can be individuated 
independently of force—in other words, a change of force does not entail a 
change of content. The assumption, which is commonly made in linguistics and 
philosophy, enables us to account for communication and linguistic 
articulation. To recognize this, suppose for a moment that force were an 
indissoluble aspect of content. In such a case, if I were to assert that Doris is a 
dancer and you were to question that she is a dancer, my assertion and your 
question would not merely reflect differences in the way we said things, they 
would reflect differences in what we said. In addition to radically multiplying 
the number of contents you and I grasp, our very ability to disagree and, for 
that matter, to communicate would be undermined. Your questions and my 
assertions would not have the same contents. Moreover, and more to the point, 
if force were an indissoluble aspect of content, my own thoughts and utterances 
might themselves be out of synch. For example, if belief and assertion were 
taken to be different force types (I do not mean to suggest they are—but 
consider this for a moment), my belief that Aaron will become a musician and 
my assertion that he will become a musician would have different contents, 
suggesting that I could not in principle articulate what I think (or think what I 
say). In such a case, while I could use an assertion like ‘I believe that Aaron is 
a musician’ to refer to my belief, such an assertion would fail to articulate the 
content of the belief. 
Although the contents of much of language and thought heed the 
force/content distinction, the contents of art and aesthetic experiences, I 
                                                
26 For a more detailed discussion of the force/content distinction, see York Gunther, Essays on 
Nonconceptual Content (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003), pp. 8-14 and pp. 279-288. 
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suggest, do not. Their force is an indissoluble aspect of their contents, which is 
to say that their force partially determines the kind of contents they have. This 
is why the contents of, say, Olympia cannot be articulated linguistically. To 
articulate the painting’s content linguistically, one would have to separate it 
from its force and reattach it to an assertion. However, since the force of an 
artwork or aesthetic experience is an indissoluble aspect of its content, because 
a difference of force entails a difference of content, this cannot be done. And 
for this reason, we cannot assert or describe what Olympia is about. Of course, 
one could describe what the painting refers to, suggest what Manet’s intentions 
as a painter were, or even ascribe metaphorical speech acts to it. But none of 
these constitutes an articulation of the painting’s content. 
It is worth emphasizing that both claims are required for the semantic 
account. On the one hand, claiming only that artworks and aesthetic 
experiences violate the force/content distinction is insufficient to explain 
ineffability. The problem is, if a nonverbal artwork had an assertoric force, its 
content would be presented in the same way as an assertion, suggesting that its 
content could be articulated by some assertion. On the other hand, claiming 
only that aesthetic force is functionless, leaves open the possibility that the 
aesthetic content could be separated from its aesthetic force and reattached to 
an assertion, again suggesting that it could be articulated. By advancing both 
claims, however, we seem to have ourselves an adequate account of 
ineffability. 
 
The Account’s Adequacy 
Unlike psychological and metaphysical accounts, the semantic account can 
escape the aforementioned dilemma. Recall that psychological accounts lack 
the means to explain invariability, whereas metaphysical accounts 
unnecessarily appeal to entities whose existence is considered controversial. 
My account does neither. An artwork and aesthetic experience remains 
ineffable irrespective of differences in the vocabulary, concepts, memory, and 
so on, of individuals or communities. For despite such differences, aesthetic 
force remains functionless and an indissoluble aspect of aesthetic content. 
Thus, there would not be any variation in the degree to which an artwork or 
aesthetic experience is ineffable, suggesting that ineffability is non-relative. 
But what of its indefeasible character? One might suppose that 
indefeasibility is not explained by the account since it does not rule out the 
possibility that an object or event might be at one point in time an artwork and 
at another a non-artwork. The fact that aesthetic force itself is fixed in some 
sense by human beings, whether individuals or communities (as well as the fact 
that it is an indissoluble aspect of aesthetic content), suggests the possibility 
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that human beings could withdraw their ‘endorsement’ of an object as an 
artwork. And if this were the case, it would suggest that the object (event) in 
question would no longer have aesthetic force (or violate the force/content 
distinction). And this, it might be supposed, would leave its content 
‘vulnerable’ to articulation. 
It is certainly true that the account does not rule out the possibility of 
such ontological changes. An object might well change its ontological status 
from being an artwork to being a non-artwork, or vice versa. However, this 
does not imply that the object as an artwork could have its content articulated 
if it became a non-artwork. For while an artwork, its status as an artwork 
partially determines the kind of content it has. That is, because as an artwork it 
has aesthetic force and as a non-artwork it does not, and because this force is 
an indissoluble aspect of its content, to change its ontological status from 
artwork to non-artwork would be to change its content. In this way, while the 
content of a non-artwork could be articulated, the content of the artwork as 
artwork could not, which is sufficient to explain the indefeasible character of 
ineffability. 
The suggestion that an object could change its ontological status from 
a non-artwork to an artwork may be thought to raise a different problem. While 
the semantic account explains invariability, one might suppose that it does so 
only by appealing to a metaphysical conception of art. That is, it is only by 
positing aesthetic force, which seems to be a metaphysical property, that an 
account of invariability is possible. Such a concern, however, is misplaced. The 
fact that an object can become an artwork does not constitute a metaphysical 
inflation. Although mere objects can become artworks, their transformation 
does not involve appealing to any immaterial properties or an otherworldly 
realm. It is true that an object’s being an artwork depends on its having 
aesthetic force, which is a non-perceptual, external property. But, as I 
suggested earlier, aesthetic force might be determined in any number of ways 
(e.g. by an artist’s unconscious mental states, the social conditions of its origin, 
an audience’s experience of the work, the art community’s reception of it), 
none of which assumes the existence of controversial metaphysical entities. 
The semantic account, it should be emphasized, does not presuppose 
the truth of the Isomorphic Representation Thesis either. Recall that the thesis 
claims that only media with the same logical structure can express an artwork’s 
content because the medium in question must have a logical structure that is 
isomorphic with the ontological structure of its reference. Such an assumption 
is not needed. The ineffability of artworks and aesthetic experiences has 
nothing to do with what they are about. Nor does it have anything to do with an 
aesthetic experience’s phenomenology. The reason that an artwork and 
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aesthetic experience are ineffable concerns their force and that fact that this 
force partially determines the kind of content an artwork has. In short, on the 
semantic account, ineffability is a property of intentionality. 
Of course on this account, ineffability is a property of any aesthetic 
content, whether the artwork is verbal or nonverbal. In other words, the 
account applies to novels, poems and plays as well as to paintings, pieces of 
music and danceworks. The reason is that I have connected an account of 
ineffability closely to a characterization of art generally. While this deserves a 
more detailed discussion than I am prepared to give it here, one implication of 
this approach is that it meets the second as well as the first challenge. Recall 
that the proponent of aesthetic ineffability faces two challenges, viz. to account 
for the property of ineffability and to establish its instantiation by artworks and 
aesthetic experiences. Although I have explicitly undertaken the former, 
because my account closely connects ineffability with what an artwork is, I 
have established ineffability’s instantiation. That is, if one assumes that there 
are artworks and that my partial characterization of them is correct, the 
instantiation of ineffability follows. 
But what of significance? Well, in the case of a good artwork, our 
experience of the work can offer us a unique perspective (intentional content), 
which may reveal a “great truth of life” in a new light. Unlike Manet’s 
Olympia, Sibelius’ Second Symphony, Rodin’s Burghers of Calais or 
Cunningham’s Beach Birds, the everyday sights and sounds of red 
strawberries, creaking doors, jagged stones, and fluttering laundry do not give 
us experiential contents that do this. In fact, it might turn out that certain 
influential artworks, e.g. the ready-mades of Duchamp, might not do this 
either. (To determine whether they do requires a further investigation as it is 
outside of the purview of the present article.) But regardless of this, the 
semantic account does not explain ineffability in terms of fineness of grain, as 
Raffman does, and thus such a distinction can firmly be drawn between the 
two. It is also noteworthy that the significance of aesthetic experiences need 
not be explained hedonistically, as Scruton and Addis suggest. Our tendency to 
search out unique perspectives may have nothing to do with an obsession for 
acquiring new phenomenological states. Artworks and aesthetic experiences 
are, more often than not, about something other than phenomenology. 
 
Conclusion 
And where does this leave the art critic? The critic’s role is, in effect, to relay 
the significance of an artwork or its experience in full knowledge of its 
ineffability. This she may undertake in any number of ways. She may mention 
the artist’s conscious or unconscious intentions, the social conditions of the 
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work’s origin, the difference between its reception then and now, and so on. 
With such explanations, it may be useful to regard artworks as pseudo-
speech acts, in hopes of drawing some kind of parallel with the way a 
specific artwork or aesthetic experience presents its content and the way a 
genuine speech act does. Moreover, in attempting to specify the artwork’s 
subject-matter, she may set out to fix as completely as possible its 
reference. Yet, if she recognizes her limitations as a critic, she will be ever-
cognizant of the fact that the contents of her review and the artwork can at 
best form an unbridgeable Fregean puzzle. While co-referential, their 
contents as well as their aims will always differ. And we, as audiences and 
readers should appreciate that this is the best any critic can do, that nothing 
more can be expected. She, as our linguistic guide, can only lead us to the 
boundaries of language and leave us there, without a word, to experience 
art. Of course, this is what many admirers of art have known all along. And 
it is why they have chosen to become artists or to remain audience 
members rather than to fashion themselves as art critics. 
 
 
